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11 Introduction
Financial frictions imply that a ﬁrm’s borrowing capacity depends on the collateral value of
its pledgeable real assets. This dependence is at the core of a collateral channel that ampliﬁes
the eﬀect of real shocks on economic ﬂuctuations when economic activity aﬀects the collateral
value of real assets (Bernanke and Gertler, 1989; Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997). While prior
research has found a positive relationship between the price of real estate and investment of
U.S. ﬁrms (Chaney et al., 2010) or between the price of land and debt capacity of Japanese
ﬁrms (Gan, 2007), little is known about how the magnitude of the collateral channel varies
across environments characterized by diﬀerent levels of ﬁnancial frictions.1 In this paper, we
analyze how cross-country variation in debt enforcement aﬀects the sensitivity of economic
activity to collateral values. We ﬁnd that industry size and growth are more sensitive to
collateral values in countries with weaker debt enforcement institutions. We rationalize this
ﬁnding based on a stylized model of credit under imperfect enforcement in which the quality
of debt enforcement aﬀects the bargaining power of the lender in the process of renegotiating
the debt contract after a borrower’s repudiation.
Our empirical investigation is based on a cross-industry cross-country approach. We regress
an economic outcome, either the relative size or the growth rate of value added in an industry,
on the interaction between the industry’s collateral value and the country’s quality of debt
enforcement, controlling for industry and country ﬁxed eﬀects and other determinants of eco-
nomic performance. Because no comprehensive data on collateral values of diﬀerent real asset
types are available and observed collateral values would not necessarily meet the expected
resale values upon default, we construct a novel industry-speciﬁc measure of real assets’ re-
deployability - the ease with which real assets used by ﬁrms in an industry are transferred to
alternative uses - as a proxy for the industry’s collateral liquidation value (Williamson, 1988;
Shleifer and Vishny, 1992). In a ﬁrst step, we compute the redeployability of diﬀerent asset
types by exploiting the heterogeneity of expenditures in new and used capital across U.S. in-
dustries. We consider a real asset to be more redeployable if industries purchase on average a
high share of used capital of that type; and we deﬁne the redeployability of an industry’s real
assets portfolio as the weighted average of the redeployability index of each real asset type,
where the weights are the shares of capital of each type in the total capital stock employed
by the industry. Our measure is designed to capture technological factors such as the degree
of speciﬁcity of real assets to industries and therefore the long-term collateral value of an
industry’s real assets. As a proxy for a country’s quality of debt enforcement, we use Djankov
et al. (2008)’s measure of the eﬃciency of debt enforcement procedures.
Using data on 28 manufacturing industries located in 67 countries over the period 1980-2000,
we ﬁnd that the diﬀerences in size and growth between industries with high and low collateral
values are larger in countries with weaker debt enforcement institutions. Our estimates predict
1Chaney et al. (2010) provide evidence that the sensitivity of investment to collateral values is stronger for
ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms based on ﬁrm-level indicators of credit constraints.
2that a representative industry located in a country that ranks at the 25th percentile of the debt
enforcement quality index (like Guatemala) would shrink by 0.3 percentage points in terms
of value added relative to GDP with respect to the same industry in a country ranked at the
75th percentile (like Sweden) if its collateral value would decline from the 75th to the 25th
percentile of the redeployability index. This diﬀerential eﬀect is economically signiﬁcant as
the average size of an industry in the sample equals 0.64%. The diﬀerential eﬀect predicted by
the growth regression amounts to an extra 1.6 percentage points drop of annual growth in the
country with weak debt enforcement institutions. Again, this eﬀect is sizable as it compares
to an average annual growth rate of 2.18%. These ﬁndings are robust to controlling for the
standard determinants of economic peformance and using instrumental variables. They are
also robust to using alternative measures of debt enforcement and economic activity, varying
the sample periods and controlling for alternative channels that might spuriously drive our
results through their correlation with the channel we highlight.
Our main results rest on the assumption that secured lending is an important ﬁnancing
instrument for ﬁrms in all countries. However, it might be the case that in countries where
collateral pledging is too costly due to institutional weaknesses, ﬁrms resort to alternative
forms of ﬁnancing like unsecured loans, third-party guarantees and relationship lending (see
Menkhoﬀ et al., 2011) or leasing (see Eisfeldt and Rampini, 2009). As a consequence, the
importance of the collateral channel for aggregate activity might be smaller in those countries.
In light of this argument, we run our benchmark regression in subsamples of rich and poor
countries and expect to ﬁnd no signiﬁcant eﬀect in the latter group of countries. Our estimates
are indeed in line with this hypothesis. We ﬁnd a negative and signiﬁcant eﬀect of the quality
of debt enforcement on the collateral channel in the sample of rich countries but no signiﬁcant
eﬀect in the sample of poor countries.
We further show that the basic source of variation in the collateral channel across countries
is the quality of debt enforcement in the sense that ﬁnancial development has no impact on
the collateral channel when the eﬀect of institutions is taken into account. We also disentangle
the eﬀect of legal rules devised to protect creditors and of their enforcement in alleviating
ﬁnancial constraints. We ﬁnd that only debt enforcement has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the
collateral channel. Altogether, our results suggest that if the objective of a policymaker is
to mitigate the sensitivity of economic activity to ﬂuctuations in collateral values then her
focus should be on improving the quality of legal institutions devised to enforce debt contracts
rather than ﬁnancial development alone.
We rationalize this empirical evidence in a stylized model of credit under imperfect en-
forcement. The framework implies a standard credit constraint for a borrower that is due the
fact that the cash-ﬂows of her project are non-contractible and she may repudiate the debt
contract. Since the credit multiplier of the borrower is positively associated with the liqui-
dation value of the real assets pledged as collateral, our model features a collateral channel.
This collateral channel is ampliﬁed or mitigated when debt enforcement institutions weaken
3depending on how debt enforcement is interpreted. If the quality of debt enforcement aﬀects
the bargaining power of the lender in the process of renegotiating the debt contract after repu-
diation (see e.g. Jermann and Quadrini, 2009), then the collateral channel is ampliﬁed in the
presence of weak debt enforcement institutions. Fluctuations in collateral values have a larger
impact on the share of the surplus that the lender is able to obtain from the renegotiation
process when this share is lower because of a lower bargainning power. Alternatively, if the
quality of debt enforcement aﬀects the lender’s ability to repossess assets from a liquidated
borrower (see e.g. Eisfeldt and Rampini, 2007, 2009), the collateral channel is mitigated in
the presence of weak debt enforcement institutions. Intuitively, the ﬂuctuation in the credit
multiplier arising from a given ﬂuctuation in the collateral value corresponds to the fraction
of the collateral that the lender is able to repossess which is lower in countries with weaker
institutions. Our empirical results unambiguously favour the ﬁrst interpretation.
The stylized model we present provides a basis for discussing an implication of our empirical
ﬁndings. As the sensitivity of economic activity to collateral values is stronger in countries
with weak debt enforcement institutions, macroeconomic volatility generated by comparable
ﬂuctuations in collateral values will be higher in countries with weaker institutions. This
result is in line with empirical evidence presented in Acemoglu et al. (2003) and Koren and
Tenreyro (2007). Acemoglu et al. (2003) ﬁnd that the development of institutions is the driver
in the reduction of macroeconomic volatility, while Koren and Tenreyro (2007) show that 50
percent of the diﬀerence in volatility between developed and developing countries is explained
by diﬀerences in country-speciﬁc volatility. Our empirical investigation thus suggests a speciﬁc
channel through which the quality of institutions causes macroeconomic volatility.
This paper contributes to the large literature analysing the eﬀect of judicial eﬃciency
on ﬁnancial and economic development initiated by the seminal papers of La Porta et al.
(1997, 1998) and Demirg¨ uc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998). A strand of this literature analyses
bank loans across countries or across regions within countries characterized by heterogenous
contract enforcement eﬃciency or creditor protection. A general ﬁnding of these papers is
that ﬁnancing conditions are worse under weaker institutions (see e.g. Laeven and Majnoni,
2005; Jappelli et al., 2005; Qian and Strahan, 2007; Bae and Goyal, 2009). Closest to our
paper are Liberti and Mian (2010) who show that a worsening in ﬁnancial development driven
by weaker institutions is associated with an increase in the diﬀerence in collateralization rates
between high- and low-risk borrowers.
The collateral channel is also related to recent ﬁndings in the empirical literature in corpo-
rate ﬁnance on the eﬀect of collateral values on ﬁnancial contracts. Empirical evidence shows
that U.S. ﬁrms using real assets with low collateral values sign ﬁnancial contracts character-
ized by higher costs, smaller size and shorter maturity than ﬁrms with high collateral values
(see e.g. Benmelech et al., 2005; Benmelech and Bergman, 2008; Benmelech, 2009; Benmelech
and Bergman, 2009; Gavazza, 2010). Finally, our paper is related to the evidence on ﬁre sales
of collateral. Pulvino (1998) documents that ﬁnancially constrained airlines receive lower
4prices for their used aircrafts than their unconstrained competitors. Acharya et al. (2007)
uses data of defaulted ﬁrms to show that industry distress aﬀects collateral liquidation values,
in particular for industry-speciﬁc assets. Benmelech and Bergman (2011) provide evidence
that bankrupt ﬁrms impose a negative externality on other ﬁrms operating in the same indus-
try through their eﬀect on collateral values. In contrast to these papers on collateral values
in ﬁre sales, we focus on the long term value of collateral and use a mesure of redeployability
that captures technological factors.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we explain the empirical strategy used
to identify the eﬀect of debt enforcement on the sensitivity of economic activity to collateral
values. We introduce our novel industry-speciﬁc measure of real assets’ redeployability and
describe the data on economic activity and debt enforcement in Section 3. Section 4 presents
the results of the empirical analysis and the robustness checks. In section 5, we provide a
theoretical framework that rationalizes our empirical results and discuss their implication for
the relationship between institutions and macroeconomic volatility. We conclude in Section
6.
2 Empirical Strategy
We adopt a cross-industry cross-country approach to identify the eﬀect of the quality of debt
enforcement on the sensitivity of economic activity to collateral values. As discussed more
deeply in the next section, we build an industry-level measure of redeployability of real assets
using U.S. data as a proxy for the collateral value. Speciﬁcally, we estimate the parameters
of the following empirical model :
Yic = β × Redeployabilityi × Debt Enforcementc + γXic + ηi + ηc + εic (1)
where i and c indexes industries and countries, respectively. The dependent variable Yic
measures an economic outcome either the share of the industry in the country’s GDP or
the industry growth. The variable of interest is the interaction term Redeployabilityi ×
Debt enforcementc, where Redeployabilityi measures the redeployability of the industry’s real
assets and Debt Enforcementc measures the quality of debt enforcement in the country. Xic is
a set of additional determinants of economic activity, ηi an industry ﬁxed eﬀect, ηc a country
ﬁxed eﬀect and εic a random error. The coeﬃcient β quantiﬁes the eﬀect of the quality of debt
enforcement on the magnitude of the collateral channel. For example, a negative and signif-
icant point estimate of β would indicate that the sensitivity of economic activity is stronger
in countries with weaker debt enforcement.
The cross-industry cross-country approach allows to include industry and country ﬁxed
eﬀects to control for any determinants of economic activity that vary at the industry or
5country level and thus reduces the concern of omitted variable bias. 2 However, we still need
to include potential determinants of economic activity that vary over both dimensions and
might be correlated with the interaction term Redeployabilityi × Debt Enforcementc. Our
results would be misleading if we omit to control for these alternative channels, since the
channel we identify would absorb all their eﬀect. We take care of this problem in Section
5.3.2.
The second reason to be cautious about the estimate of β is the potential endogeneity of
Debt Enforcementc. If industries with lower real assets’ redeployability increase their size and
growth rate, policymakers might be tempted to improve insolvency institutions. This process
might result in making debt enforcement endogenous to the evolution of economic activity.
To solve this problem, we estimate the emprical model (1) using the method of instrumental
variables (IV). Following La Porta et al. (1998), the legal origin of commercial laws is the
instrument usually used for ﬁnancial development in the ﬁnance and growth literature. We
slightly depart from the literature in that respect. Djankov et al. (2008) provide country-level
data on the legal origin of bankruptcy laws and the quality of debt enforcement.3 They ﬁnd
that the legal origin of bankruptcy laws is one of the most important cross-country determi-
nants of debt enforcement quality. Based on that evidence, instrumenting debt enforcement
by the legal origin of brankruptcy laws seems more appropriate. We also have to take care
of the potential endogeneity of Redeployabilityi. Our strategy is to exclude the United States
from our regressions, as the redeployability index is calculated from U.S. industry data. This
strategy is standard in the literature employing an industry characteristic measured in a
benchmark country in a cross-industry cross-country framework (see e.g. Rajan and Zingales,
1998; Claessens and Laeven, 2003; Fisman and Love, 2007). It is worth noting that an impor-
tant aspect of the speciﬁcation is that the redeployability of real assets is considered speciﬁc
to the industry (no cross-country variation). To be valid, this approach requires that our
redeployability measure based on U.S. industries data captures technological characteristics
of the industry. We will discuss the adequacy of our measure of real assets’ redeployability
with this important assumption in Section 3.1.
The last potential problem for the identiﬁcation of the collateral channel is measurement
errors of the interaction term. We address the potential measurement error problem of
Debt Enforcementc by using the legal origin of countries’ bankruptcy laws as an instrument.
The collateral value of real assets depends on factors varying at the country and industry
levels and idiosyncratic terms. Due to a lack of data availability and other reasons explained
in Section 4.1, we do not attempt to measure the actual collateral value of real assets, but
we measure the industry-speciﬁc component of it, which is the redeployability of real assets
2The inclusion of industry and country ﬁxed eﬀects comes at the cost of not being able to identify the
collateral channel and the overall eﬀect of debt enforcement on economic activity since both are subsumed
in the ﬁxed eﬀects. However, as they are not the main objects of interest in our paper, this disadvantage is
strongly overbalanced by the advantage arising from the reduction in omitted variable bias.
3Up to some exceptions, the legal origin of bankruptcy laws is identical to the legal origin of commercial
laws reported in La Porta et al. (1998).
6arising from technological factors. It still could be that we measure the redeployability of real
assets with some error. Under the assumption that idiosyncratic terms are uncorrelated with
industry-speciﬁc variables, this would lead to a classical attenuation bias with β being biased
towards zero4. At the time, we do not have instruments for the redeployability of real assets
to address this issue. Further testing of the collateral channel with an appropriate instrument
is an important task left for future research.
3 Data
3.1 Measuring the Redeployability of Real Assets
3.1.1 Motivation and Methodology
Testing the eﬀect of imperfect debt enforcement on the collateral channel requires that we
observe the collateral liquidation values of diﬀerent types of real assets in order to compute the
collateral value of a portfolio of real assets owned by an industry. Such a direct approach poses
two problems. First, no comprehensive data on collateral liquidation values are available for a
wide range of real assets.5 Second, at the time the debt contract is signed observed collateral
liquidation values do not necessarily meet the expected resale values upon default.
We therefore have to ﬁnd an indirect way to capture the expected value of collateral to
lenders upon default. We follow Williamson (1988) and Shleifer and Vishny (1992) who argue
that the liquidation value of a real asset is closely related to the ability to redeploy it to other
ﬁrms. The identiﬁcation of the redeployability of a real asset in liquidation ﬁrst requires to
determine the potential buyers. We assume that the potential buyers of a used real asset are
the ﬁrms already operating it. Second, we need to ﬁnd the determinants of the redeployability
of a real asset in liquidation to the potential buyers. We suppose that a real asset is more easily
redeployed to ﬁrms in an industry whose expenditures in used assets of that type represent a
large fraction of their total expenditures in capital. The ﬁrst assumption is standard in the
literature on ﬁnancial contracts and liquidation values (see Benmelech and Bergman, 2008;
Benmelech, 2009; Benmelech and Bergman, 2009; Gavazza, 2010). Regarding the second one,
we rather consider the investment ﬂows of used capital instead of the stock of capital since
investment in used real assets is a more accurate proxy for liquidity and better capture trading
frictions in secondary markets. This assumption is based on Gavazza (2011) who investigates
the role of trading frictions in real asset markets. He argues that traders must incur trading
4Formally, the problem is the follwing: suppose that the true model of the economy is Yic = β ×
Collateral Valueic × Debt Enforcementc + γXic + ηi + ηc + εic, with Collateral Valueic = αc + αi + αic but
instead, we estimate Yic = β × Redeployabilityi × Debt Enforcementc + γXic + ηi + ˜ ηc + νic, where νic =
β×(αic−ui)×Debt Enforcementc+εic and ˜ ηc = ηc+β×αc×Debt Enforcementc with Redeployabilityi = αi+ui.
Under the assumptions E[αiαic] = E[αiεic] = E[αiui] = E[αicui] = E[εicui] = 0, ˆ β is plagued by a classical
measurement error bias (attenuation bias).
5There are data avalaible on ﬁrm-level transaction prices for one particular type of real asset, namely
commercial aircrafts. See Pulvino (1998) and Gavazza (2011).
7costs to ﬁnd a trading partner because secondary markets of real assets are decentralized.
The value of the search process to match buyers and sellers increases with the market size
of used capital as the probability to ﬁnd a good match is larger. Therefore if the market
of used capital of a given type is thin, market participants do not search exhaustively for
the best matches which reduces on average the number of transactions and the transaction
prices. Using datasets concerning the market of commercial aircrafts, Gavazza (2011) provides
evidence consistent with these predictions. He ﬁnds that an aircraft model with a thinner
market (i.e. with a lower stock or fewer operators) is less frequently traded and fetches lower
average transaction prices.
To compute a proxy for the collateral liquidation value of a real asset based on its re-
deployability, we exploit the heterogeneity in the expenditures in used and new capital of
that type across industries. Based on the two aforementioned assumptions, we measure the





















a,i , respectively. Then to construct a proxy for the sector-level collateral
value, we aggregate the asset-type redeployability measures across all real assets owned by
ﬁrms in industry i. Speciﬁcally, we build an industry measure of redeployability as a weighted




ωa,i × Redeployabilitya (3)
where the weight ωa,i is the share of real assets of type a in total real assets owned by industry
i. In contrast to observed collateral liquidation values, the asset-type based measure (2) serves
to capture the long-term collateral value of a real asset. This strategy puts less emphasis on
current market condition and prices, and ﬁts better to the need to measure the expected
collateral value of a portfolio of real assets owned by an industry.
The industry measure of real assets’ redeployability (3) is computed solely from U.S. data
and extrapolated to industries located in other countries.6 The validity of this approach relies
on two basic assumptions. First, there is a technological reason why some industries purchase
a lower share of used capital of a given type (due for instance to the speciﬁcity of the asset
required in the production process) and own a diﬀerent portfolio of real assets. If the U.S.
6This approach is based on Rajan and Zingales (1998) and frequently used in the ﬁnance and growth
literature (see Claessens and Laeven, 2003; Braun, 2005; Ilyina and Samaniego, 2011). In contrast to these
studies, we use industry-level data to compute the redeployability measure instead of ﬁrm-level data, because
ﬁrm-level data from Compustat does not oﬀer a high enough level of disaggregation for asset types. However
we are not the ﬁrst to use industry-level data in order to compute an industry-speciﬁc characteristic and apply
the same empirical methodology (see Nunn, 2007).
8economy can be considered as relatively frictionless and thus represents a good benchmark,
the computation of the redeployability from U.S. data should reﬂect exogenous characteris-
tics of the industry production technology. As shown in Table A1 of the appendix, measures
of redeployability are highly correlated across diﬀerent decades (1960’s, 1970’s, 1980’s and
1990’s). The Spearman’s rank correlation coeﬃcients are above 0.9 with the null hypothesis
of independance strongly rejected (below the 1 percent level of signiﬁcance).7 These ﬁndings
support the assumption that the determinants of redeployability in expression (3) are mainly
technological and can be considered as industry-speciﬁc at least for the US economy. Second,
we assume that the technological diﬀerences underlying the ranking of redeployability across
industries persist across countries. Unfortunately, we cannot test whether the industry mea-
sures of redeployability are highly correlated across countries since no data on real assets with
high enough disaggregation at the asset level are available for other countries.
3.1.2 The Measure
The measure of redeployability of each type of real asset given in expression (2) is calculated
combining two distinct sources that provide data on capital expenditures for a wide range of
U.S. manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors.8 The Detailed Fixed Assets Tables from
the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) detail the expenditures in private nonresidential
real assets for 73 types, belonging to the broad categories Equipment and Structures. This
database is available on a yearly frequency over the period 1901-2009, but only provides data
on total capital expenditures without disaggregeting expenditures in used and new real assets
of each type. On the contrary, the Annual Capital Expenditure Survey (ACES) dataset from
U.S. Census Bureau provides data on used and new capital expenditures on an annual basis
over the period 1994-2006 but only for the two broad categories Equipment and Structures.
To extract the available information from the two datasets, we decompose expression (2) into
two main determinants of the redeployability of real asset a, namely the market liquidity and

























The ﬁrst determinant, liquidity, accounts for the relative thickness of the asset market and is
averaged over the period 1980-2000 for each real asset in each industry using the Detailed Fixed
Assets Tables.9 The second determinant, nonspeciﬁcity, captures the degree of substitutability
7Note that Pearson correlations are of the same order of magnitude and highly statistically signiﬁcant.
8The industrial classiﬁcation of the two datasets is not similar. See the the details in appendix B.1 for the
conversion.
9Since our measure of redeployability represents a proxy for all the countries in our sample, we do not
calculate the absolute liquidity provided by industries as in the aforementioned studies, but the liquidity
provided for an asset a relative to total assets.
9between used and new capital. We average it over the available time period for each real asset
in each industry using the ACES dataset. Since used and new capital expenditures are only
split into two broad categories Equipment and Structures, the nonspeciﬁcity measure is equal
for all real assets that fall into the same category.10 Ramey and Shapiro (2001) claim that
these two ingredients can be considered as a plausible characterization of secondary capital
markets. They argue that capital specialization at the ﬁrm level entails search costs to ﬁnd
potential buyers with the best match to the real asset’s characteristics and thus ready to
pay a price close to its fundamental value. In line with Gavazza (2011), a thin market and
a high degree of speciﬁcity for a real asset increase the search costs and hence decreases its
liquidation value.
The industry measure of redeployability (3) based on the asset-type redeployability (4)
is calculated for manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries identiﬁed by the North
American Industry Classiﬁcation System (NAICS). For interpration purposes, we normalize
it by dividing the redeployability of each sector by the highest redeployability index. Since
data on economic activity are detailed at the 3-digits ISIC Rev. 2 classiﬁcation and only
available for industries in the manufacturing sector, we match industries corresponding to
both classiﬁcations and report the measure only for manufacturing industries. The details of
the concordance can be found in Appendix B.1.11 We tabulate the measure of redeployability
of real assets by ISIC industry in ascending order in Table 1. According to our measure, the
industries that have the most redeployable assets are Leather products, Wearing apparel and
Textiles while the ones with the lowest measure are Transport equipment, Footwear, Iron and
steel and Fabricated metal products. A second source of heterogeneity in liquidation values is
the relative quantity of tangible assets used by ﬁrms. We report in Table 1 the measure of
Tangibility of assets from Braun (2005) as well as the Pearson’s coeﬃcent correlation between
the two measures. The two source of heterogeneity are distinct as we cannot reject the null
hypothesis of no correlation.12
3.2 Measures of Debt Enforcement and Economic Activity
To test the collateral channel under imperfect debt enforcement, we use the measure of eﬃ-
ciency of debt enforcement procedures constructed by Djankov et al. (2008) as a proxy for the
quality of debt enforcement. Djankov et al. (2008) presented a case study of an identical ﬁrm
about to default on its debt to insolvency practitioners in 88 countries. They then collected
10Almeida et al. (2009) and Campello and Giambona (2010) argue that equipment capital is less speciﬁc
than other types of capital, like buildings (falling into category Structure). This assumption is conﬁrmed by
our measure. On average, the ratio of used to total capital expenditures is equal to 7.8 percents for Equipment
and to 5.6 percents for Structures
11Our strategy is to link each of the two classiﬁcations to the 6-digits NAICS 2002 classiﬁcation and then
use the number of NAICS 2002 categories that link BEA and ISIC categories to choose which BEA category is
attributed to a ISIC category. The advantage of this method is that all ISIC categories are mapped. However,
for some ISIC categories the same BEA category is attributed, which reduces the variability of our measure
across industries.
12The signiﬁcance level of the correlation coeﬃcient is 31.3%.
10Table 1. Redeployability of Real Assets and Tangibility of Assets
ISIC Industrial sector Redeployability Tangibility
384 Transport equipment .6093 .2548
324 Footwear, except rubber or plastic .6396 .1167
371 Iron and steel .6396 .4581
381 Fabricated metal products .6396 .2812
341 Paper and products .6510 .5579
372 Non-ferrous metals .6540 .3832
362 Glass and products .6631 .3313
382 Machinery, except electrical .6631 .1825
383 Machinery, electric .6848 .2133
385 Professional and scientiﬁc equipment .6848 .1511
351 Industrial chemicals .6881 .4116
352 Other chemicals .6881 .1973
355 Rubber products .6995 .3790
356 Plastic products .6995 .3448
390 Other manufactured products .7034 .1882
311 Food products .7338 .3777
313 Beverages .7338 .2794
314 Tobacco .7338 .2208
342 Printing and publishing .7413 .3007
353 Petroleum reﬁneries .7492 .6708
354 Miscellaneous petroleum and coal products .7492 .3038
361 Pottery, china, earthenware .7537 .0745
369 Other non-metallic mineral products .7537 .4200
332 Furniture, except metal .7708 .2630
331 Wood products, except furniture .7718 .3796
321 Textiles .8056 .3730
322 Wearing apparel, except footwear .8896 .1317
323 Leather products .8896 .0906
Mean 0.7172 0.2977
Correlation 1 −0.19a
Notes: Redeployability is the redeployability of real assets used by U.S. ﬁrms between 1981-2000 in industry i and is
deﬁned by expression (3) in the text. Tangibility of assets is the median ratio of net property, plant and equipment
to total assets over U.S. ﬁrms in industry i (see Braun, 2005).
a indicates that the null hypothesis of no correlation
is not rejected at 10% level.
their responses on various aspects corresponding to domestic procedures required to enforce
the debt contract. The measure of debt enforcement eﬃciency deﬁnes the present value of
the terminal value of the ﬁrm minus bankruptcy costs and combines data on three aspects of
debt enforcement. The ﬁrst aspect considers whether the ﬁrm is kept as going concern or sold
piecemeal, assuming its value is lower in the latter case. The second aspect is the legal costs
associated with the enforcement procedure. The third aspect measures the opportunity costs
arising from the time to resolve the enforcement procedure and the level of interest rates. A
formal description of the measure is provided in Appendix B.1.
A major drawback of the measure constructed by Djankov et al. (2008) is that it is based
on responses collected after our sample period. Ideally, we would like to use a measure of
debt enforcement quality that covers the period 1980 to 2000 considered in the empirical
analysis. Indeed, insolvency procedures may have evolved over time in response to economic
11performance and using ex-post values is known as raising deeper issues concerning endogeneity.
We believe the concern to be small for two reasons. First, as mentioned in the section devoted
to the empirical strategy, we adress the issue of reverse causality using IV. Second, measures
of institutions are shown to be persistent over long periods of time (Acemoglu et al., 2001,
2002). However in a robustness check, we proxy the quality of debt enforcement by the
average size of debt market over the period 1980-2000 since Djankov et al. (2008) provides
evidence that their measure of debt enforcement quality is a strong predictor of debt market
size across countries. Table 2 reports the measure of debt enforcement quality with the
associated debt market size for the three most and three least eﬃcient countries across two
groups, the high-income and middle- to low-income countries. We observe that high-income
Table 2. Debt Enforcement and Debt Market Size across Countries
High-Income Countries Middle- and Low-Income Countries
Country Debt Debt Country Debt Debt
Enforcement Market Size Enforcement Market Size
Singapore 0.961 0.981 Mexico 0.726 0.177
Japan 0.955 1.627 Colombia 0.648 0.295
Netherlands 0.949 1.106 Tunisia 0.566 0.592
... ...
Greece 0.538 0.348 Brazil 0.134 0.300
Hungary 0.467 0.286 Venezuela 0.131 0.312
Italy 0.453 0.539 Turkey 0.066 0.146
Number of countries 25 25 26 26
Mean 0.782 0.794 0.364 0.375
t-test of diﬀerence 9.13** 5.01**
in means
Correlation 1 0.454* 1 0.338+
Notes: This table reports the eﬃciency of debt enforcement from Djankov et al. (2008) for the 3 most and 3 least eﬃcient
countries across high-income and non high-income countries present in our regression samples. For these countries, it
reports debt market size measured as the average ratio of private credit by deposit money bank and other ﬁnancial
institutions to GDP between 1981-2000. To classify countries, we use the World Bank classiﬁcation of countries. We
also present the means and correlations of the two measures for each group, and t-statistics for the diﬀerence in means
across the two groups. **: signiﬁcant at 1% level. *: signiﬁcant at 5% level.
+: signﬁcant at 10% level.
countries have more eﬃcent debt enforcement procedures than those in middle- and low-
income countries. The diﬀerence is highly statistically signiﬁcant showing some heterogeneity
in debt enforcement across countries. Moreover debt market size is signiﬁcantly correlated
with debt market size associated to each group of countries.13
Economic activity is measured using production data collected annually by the United
Nations Industrial Developlment Organization (UNIDO). Speciﬁcally, we use the database
compiled by Nicita and Olarreaga (2007) which covers 100 countries over the period 1976-
2004. The data are disaggregated into 28 industries of the manufacturing sector according
13The Spearman correlation for the sample holding the two groups is equal to 0.661 and signiﬁcant at the
1% percent level.
12to the ISIC Rev. 2 classiﬁcation. Our main measure of economic activity is the sectoral
value added, which represents the contribution of a particular manufacturing industry to the
country’s GDP. Speciﬁcally, we focus on two types of economic outcome. First, we adopt
an allocation perspective and ask how resources are allocated across industries with diﬀerent
collateral values within a country characterized by a certain quality of debt enforcement. In
this perspective, Yic in regression (1) is measured as the mean share of value added of industry
i to GDP in country c over the period 1981-2000. We then consider a growth perspective
and concentrate on industrial growth. The dependent variable deﬁnes the average annual
real growth rate of value added of industry i in country c over the period 1980-2000, and
is measured as the log of real value added in 2000 less the log of real value added in 1980
(divided by 20). Note that we average these measures on economic outcome over the period
1980-2000 to maximize the country coverage.
However, due to diﬀerences in country coverage between datasets of debt enforcement and
economic activity, our dataset includes 67 countries (instead of the 88 potential countries). For
some of these countries data on economic activity for the years 1980, 2000 and in-between are
missing. Moreover, we drop the benchmark country, the United States, as the redeployability
index is calculated from U.S. industry data. The sample in the basic allocation regression
reduces to 62 countries associated to 1641 observations (instead of 1736=62×28 possible
observations). In growth regressions, we are left with data on 35 countries associated to 829
observations (instead of 980=35×28 possible observations). The countries included in the
allocation and growth regressions with the number of industries available for each country are
listed in Table A.3. in the Appendix.
4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 The Collateral Channel and Debt Enforcement
We report the estimation of the empirical equation (1) in Table 3. The OLS estimates with
two-way clustered standard errors are shown in the ﬁrst four columns, while in the last
four columns we report the IV estimates with heteroskedasticity robust standard errors.14
Consistently with the two perspectives on economic activity adopted in the paper, we present
the estimates related to the allocation of economic activity within a country in panel A and
those related to economic growth in panel B. The estimation of our baseline speciﬁcation
using OLS is presented in the ﬁrst column. It includes our variable of interest, i.e. the
interaction between the industry’s real assets’ redeployability and the country’s quality of debt
enforcement (Redeployability × Debt enforcement) as well as country and industry dummy
variables. The coeﬃcient estimate on our variable of interest has a negative sign and is
signiﬁcant at the 5% level in both panels. These results indicate that industries with a low
14When the standard errors are clustered two-way by industry and country, the number of clusters become
too large to compute the IV estimates with two-way clustered standard errors as in OLS regressions.
13Table 3. The Effect of Imperfect Debt Enforcement on the Collateral Channel
OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A. Allocation: Yic = value added to GDP
Redeployability × Debt enforcement −0.043* −0.053** −0.043* −0.049* −0.070** −0.078** −0.066** −0.071**
(0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.021) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
Tangibility × Debt enforcement −0.025* −0.024 −0.033** −0.023+
(0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.012)
Depreciation × Debt enforcement 0.002** 0.002** 0.003** 0.003**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Obsolescence × Debt enforcement 0.006+ 0.004 0.008** 0.006**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Capital intensity × Capital 0.006 0.004
(0.010) (0.010)
Skill intensity × Skill 0.002 0.001
(0.003) (0.002)
Natural resources intensity × Natural resources 0.001 0.001+
(0.001) (0.000)
Diﬀerential eﬀect (percentage points) −0.17 −0.21 −0.17 −0.22 −0.27 −0.30 −0.26 −0.32
Hansen J test (p-value) − − − − 0.374 0.406 0.330 0.848
Kleinbergen-Paap statistic − − − − 219.5 104.8 96.55 13.85
R2 0.203 0.204 0.205 0.547 0.182 0.181 0.112 0.539
Observations 1641 1641 1641 1101 1641 1641 1641 1101




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
B. Growth: Yic = real growth of value added
Redeployability × Debt enforcement −0.262* −0.250* −0.268* −0.277** −0.405** −0.384** −0.409** −0.412**
(0.125) (0.115) (0.123) (0.104) (0.102) (0.106) (0.099) (0.104)
Tangibility × Debt enforcement 0.029 0.033 0.021 0.021
(0.044) (0.049) (0.053) (0.056)
Depreciation × Debt enforcement 0.001 0.002 0.006 0.008
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
Obsolescence × Debt enforcement 0.009 0.014+ 0.009 0.015
(0.007) (0.008) (0.012) (0.012)
Initial industry share −0.106* −0.124**
(0.045) (0.044)
Diﬀerential eﬀect (percentage points) −1.04 −0.99 −1.06 −1.10 −1.61 −1.52 −1.62 −1.64
Hansen J test (p-value) − − − − 0.568 0.186 0.415 0.253
Kleinbergen-Paap statistic − − − − 119.5 44.39 59.02 19.30
R2 0.599 0.599 0.599 0.605 0.596 0.596 0.594 0.600
Observations 829 829 829 829 829 829 829 829
Countries 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35
Notes: All regressions include both country and industry ﬁxed eﬀects and a constant (coeﬃcient estimates not reported). In Panel A, the dependent variable is the average share of each 3-digit ISIC
industry’s real value added to each country’s GDP over the period 1981-2000. In Panel B, the dependent variable is the annual compounded growth rate in real value added over the period 1980-2000
for each 3-digit ISIC industry in each country. The main variable of interest Redeployability × Debt enforcement denotes the product of these two variables. Redeployability deﬁned by expression
(3) in the text is the redeployability of real assets owned by each 3-digit ISIC U.S. industry between 1981-2000. Debt enforcement is a time-invarying variable constructed by Djankov et al. (2008)
and denotes the eﬃciency of debt enforcement procedures in each country. Tangibility from Braun (2005) is the median ratio of net property, plant and equipment to total assets over U.S. ﬁrms
in each 3-digit ISIC industry. Depreciation and Obsolescence from Ilyina and Samaniego (2011) are the industry rate of capital depreciation and the embodied technical change in capital measure
based on Cummins and Violante (2002). Columns 1 to 4 report the OLS estimates. Columns 5 to 8 report IV results obtained by GMM with Debt enforcement instrumented by the legal origin of
a country’s bankruptcy laws. The diﬀerential eﬀect measures in percentage points how much smaller (slower) an industry at the 25th percentile of the redeployability of real assets would become
(grow) with respect to an industry at the 75th percentile when the industries are located in a country at the 25th percentile of debt enforcement rather than in one at the 75th percentile. Standard
errors clustered two-way by industry and country (columns 1-4) and heteroskedasticity robust standard errors (columns 5-8) are reported in parentheses. **: signﬁcant at 1% level. *: signﬁcant at
5% level.
+: signﬁcant at 10% level.
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5collateral value represents a relatively smaller share of the economy (panel A) and grows more
slowly (panel B) in countries characterized by weak debt enforcement.
In this paper, we test the eﬀect of the quality of debt enforcement on the sensitivity of
economic activity to collateral values. Our focus is thus on the intensive margin of collateral
use following the terminology of Benmelech and Bergman (2009). However, the collateral
value of a defaulted ﬁrm also depends on its share of tangible assets, which can be termed
as the extensive margin of collateral use. This aspect has been shown empirically relevant
for the relative performance of industries in diﬀerent contexts (Braun, 2005; Manova, 2008).
To precisely identify the collateral channel under imperfect debt enforcement that works
through the intensive margin of collateral use (i.e. real assets’ redeployability), we thus
add an interaction between the share of tangible assets and the quality of debt enforcement
(Tangibility × Debtenforcement) to our baseline speciﬁcation in column 2. Our coeﬃcient
of interest is not signiﬁcantly aﬀected by the inclusion of this interaction term. This ﬁnding
indicates that an industry whose tangible assets are diﬃcult to redeploy will perform relatively
worse than an industry whose tangible assets are easy to redeploy in a country with weak debt
enforcement even if both industries own the same share of tangible assets. The estimates also
indicate that industries with a smaller share of tangible assets represent a relatively smaller
share of an economy in countries with weak debt enforcement, whereas the eﬀect on growth
is not signiﬁcant.
We have argued that the redeployability of a real asset determines the expected value of
collateral to lenders upon default. There are, however, other characteristics of a real asset
that could inﬂuence it. If our measure of redeployability is correlated to those characteristics,
omitting them would bias the estimate of our coeﬃcent of interest. We therefore control for
the interactions of two such characteristics with the quality of debt enforcement in column
3. The ﬁrst is the depreciation rate of capital in each industry and the second is a measure
of obsolescence or embodied technical change in capital. A real asset with a higher physical
or technological depreciation rate is expected to have a lower collateral value. Although both
characteristics aﬀect signiﬁcantly the relative allocation of economic activity with the expected
sign, as can be seem from column 3 in Panel A, their inclusion does not alter the collateral
channel under imperfect debt enforcement that works through the real assets’ redeployability.
In column 3 of Panel B, we further see that only the redeployability of real assets matter for
distinguishing the relative growth performance due to institutions.
In column 4, we further control for the standard determinants of the production structure
and industry growth of an economy. In the allocation regression, we add interactions be-
tween industry factor intensities and country factor endowments (Capital intensity ×Capital,
Skill intensity × Skill, Natural ressources intensity × Natural ressources). In line with the
Hecksher-Ohlin-Samuelson theorem, Romalis (2004) shows that these interaction terms ex-
plain a large part of the within-country variation in the structure of exports across industries.
These factors might as well explain variations in the structure of the domestic production.
16Due to the lack of availability of data on factor endowments for all countries, our regression
sample drops from 62 to 41 countries. Interestingly, our coeﬃcient of interest remains un-
changed when estimated on this sub-sample including these additional controls. In the growth
regression, we include the share of the industry in GDP at the beginning of the sample period
to account for the potential ‘catch-up’ eﬀect for industries representing a small size of the
economy. As expected, this coeﬃcient is negative and signiﬁcant, but again our coeﬃcient of
interest is not aﬀected qualitatively and quantitatively.
As mentionned in the empirical methodology, we are concerned with the potential endo-
geneity of debt enforcement. We therefore perform an instrumental variables (IV) estimation
of equation (1). To determine the most suitable method, we peformed the Pagan-Hall test of
heteroskedasticity of the error term (not shown). The null hypothesis of no heteroskedasticity
is strongly rejected (at a signiﬁcance level below 1 percent). As a result, we use the General-
ized Method of Moments (GMM) to identify our coeﬃcient of interest β since this estimator
is more eﬃcient than the Two-Stage Least Squares estimator in case of heteroskedasticity.
The identiﬁcation strategy using IV method relies on two assumptions. The ﬁrst assumption
known as the orthogonality condition states that the instrumental variables must be uncor-
related with the disturbance term. We perform the Hansen J test to test the null hypothesis
of exogeneity. The second assumption requires that the excluded instruments are suﬃciently
correlated with the included endogenous regressors. We rely on the Kleinbergen-Paap statistic
to test whether the legal origin of a country’s bankruptcy law is a valid instrument for the
quality of debt enforcement.15
Our estimates of equation (1) using GMM are reported in columns 5 to 8 of Table 3. We
see that the results are qualitatively unaﬀected by the instrumentation procedure. Across
the diﬀerent speciﬁcations, our coeﬃcient of interest is higher in absolute value. As dis-
cussed in Section 3, this result can be attributed to an attenuation bias due to measurement
errors in debt enforcement quality. The p-values of the Hansen J test are above 0.1 and
the Kleinbergen-Paap statistics are above the associated critical values in all 8 regressions.
Therefore the overidentiﬁcation and weak instrument tests validate our identiﬁcation strategy
requiring that the interaction between the legal origin of a country’s bankruptcy law and
industry’s repedeployability is truly exogenous and aﬀects only indirectly the industrial allo-
cation and growth through the correlation with our endogenous variable of interest. In the
rest of the paper, we will thus only report GMM estimates.
Besides statistical estimates and their signiﬁcance, we are interested in the economic impor-
tance of the channel we identify. To gain insight, we calculate the diﬀerential eﬀect in terms of
15The Kleinbergen-Paap statistic should be used when non-i.i.d errors are assumed as in our case. However,
this come at a cost approximating its unknown critical values with those of the Cragg-Donald statistic. Con-
versely the Cragg-Donald statistic has a known asymptotic distribution under the assumption of i.i.d errors.
The null hypothesis of the weak instrument test is that the bias of the IV estimator, relative to the bias of
OLS, exceeds the 5% threshold at the signiﬁcance level of 5%. The critical value of the Cragg-Donald statistic
associated with this test is 13.91 with 1 included endogenous regressor and 3 instrumental variables as in our
baseline regression. For the critical values in other regressions, see Stock and Yogo (2002).
17economic outcomes for an industry with a low collateral value (25th percentile) with respect
to an industry with a high collateral value (75th percentile) when debt enforcement worsens
from the 75th to the 25th percentile of debt enforcement quality.16 The industry at the 75th
percentile is Food, beverages and tobacco products (high collateral value). The industry at the
25th percentile is Fabricated metal products (low collateral value). The calculated diﬀerential
eﬀect is reported for each regression in Table 3 directly below the coeﬃcient estimates. Our
ﬁrst observation is that the eﬀect both in terms of allocation and growth through which the
channel we identify operates is economically sizable. The point estimate of column 8 in Table
3 implies that the Glass and products industry would become 0.32 percentage points smaller
in terms of value added to GDP relative to the Potery, china and earthenware industry if
a country like Sweden would reach the level of debt enforcement quality of Guatemala. In
comparison, the value added of the average industry in the sample represents 0.64 percents
of GDP. Likewise the coeﬃcient estimate in the growth regression predicts that the industry
with a low collateral value would grow annually 1.64 percentage points less than the high
collateral value industry in Jordan compared to Hong Kong. This is a substantial decrease
compared to the average annual industry growth of 2.18% in the sample.
4.2 The Collateral Channel and Debt Enforcement: Poor vs. Rich Coun-
tries
In the analysis above, we have shown that the quality of debt enforcement matters for the
collateral channel but we have assumed that secured credit was oﬀered homogeneously across
countries. There is litte evidence on the incidence of secured credit in credit markets across
countries, but Fleisig (1996) notes that a major impediment to secured credit in developing
countries are weak enforcement institutions. In countries where collateral pledging is too
costly due to institutional weaknesses, ﬁrms may resort to alternative forms of ﬁnancing like
unsecured loans, third-party guarantees and relationship lending (see Menkhoﬀ et al., 2011)
or leasing as argued by Eisfeldt and Rampini (2009).17 We therefore conjecture that the
quality of debt enforcement aﬀects the relationship between economic activity and collateral
values only in countries where secured credit is an important form of ﬁnancing. Accordingly,
we divide the sample into poorer and richer countries and run our main regression separately
in both sub-samples.
In Table 4, we report the regression results when the sample is divided into rich and poor
countries according to 3 diﬀerent criteria. The ﬁrst criterion is whether a country’s GDP
per capita in 1980 is above or below the median GDP per capita. The second criterion is
16The diﬀerential eﬀect of debt enforcement on the collateral channel is calculated as:






Debt Enforcementlow − Debt Enforcementhigh
￿
17Leasing costs are aﬀected by the leased asset’s liquidity as shown by Gavazza (2010) for the in aircraft
industry. However, there is no evidence that leasing costs are aﬀected by the quality of enforcement institutions.
Benmelech and Bergman (2010) show that while higher protection of creditor provided by law fosters investment
in newer aircraft types owned by airlines, the vintage of leased aircrafts is not aﬀected.
18whether a country is classiﬁed as High- or Middle/Low-Income by the World Bank and the
third criteria is whether a country is a member of the OECD or not. Consistent with our
conjecture, we ﬁnd that imperfect debt enforcement has a signiﬁcant impact on the sensi-
tivity of economic activity to collateral values only in rich countries. The coeﬃcients on the
interaction term Redeployability × Debt enforcement are negative and signiﬁcant in columns
1, 3 and 5 (between −0.085 and −0.091 in the allocations regression and between −0.599
and −0.727 in the growth regressions) whereas they are insigniﬁcant in the poor countries
sub-samples (columns 2, 4 and 6). Compared to the estimates obtained for the full sample,
estimates for the sub-sample of rich countries are larger in absolute terms. However, the range
of the debt enforcement index is smaller in the sub-samples. The diﬀerential eﬀect calculated
for the sub-sample of rich countries ranges from −0.12 to −0.24 in the allocation regression
which is one to two thirds smaller than in the full sample. It still represents between one
sixth and one third of the average industry size in the sample. The diﬀerential eﬀect in the
growth regressions ranges from −0.78 to −0.95 which is about half of the eﬀect calculated in
the full sample. However, the economic signiﬁcance of the diﬀerential eﬀect is much higher in
the sample of rich countries, as the average industry growth ranging from 0.43% and 0.60%
is smaller in this group of countries.
4.3 The Source of The Diﬀerential Eﬀect: Legal vs. Financial Development
The results presented in the previous section raise the question whether the quality of debt
enforcement is the basic source of the sensitivity of economic activity to collateral values or
whether it is only a proxy for ﬁnancial development. Djankov et al. (2008) show that the
quality of debt enforcement procedures is strongly correlated with the development of debt
markets. Therefore, our interaction term would capture the eﬀect of ﬁnancial development if
industries with diﬀerent levels of real assets’ redeployability are aﬀected diﬀerently by a change
in ﬁnancial development. For example, Liberti and Mian (2010) show that the development
of credit markets shifts the composition of collateralizable assets from non-speciﬁc towards
ﬁrm-speciﬁc, i.e. non-redeployable, assets. Williamson (1988) argues that ﬁrms with speciﬁc
assets are optimally ﬁnanced by equity. Following these arguments, improvements in the
development of the credit and stock markets would beneﬁt relatively more the ﬁrms with a
lower redeployability.
We rule out these two alternative explanations and show that ﬁnancial development does
not aﬀect the sensitivity of economic activity to collateral values beyond its correlation with
debt enforcement institutions. To obtain this result, we proceed as follows. First we estimate
equation (1) including the interaction term Redeployability × Financial development instead
of the interaction invloving debt enforcement. In columns 1 and 2 of Table 5 we present the
estimates obtained when Financial development is proxied with the size of the debt market,
respectively the size of the stock market. As expected, the coeﬃcient on both interaction
19Table 4. The Effect of Imperfect Debt Enforcement on the Collateral Channel : Poor vs. Rich Countries
Initial GDP WB Income Group OECD
Above Below High Middle-Low Members Non-
Median Median Income Income Members
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Allocation
Redeployability × Debt enforcement −0.085** 0.014 −0.091** 0.029 −0.091** 0.029
(0.024) (0.097) (0.028) (0.118) (0.028) (0.118)
Diﬀerential eﬀect (percentage points) −0.24 0.03 −0.12 0.05 −0.12 0.05
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hansen J test (p-value) 0.787 − 0.864 − 0.864 −
Kleinbergen-Paap statistic 222.1 8.350 240.2 5.501 240.2 5.501
R2 0.582 0.571 0.628 0.575 0.628 0.575
Observations 560 541 476 625 476 625
Countries 21 20 18 23 18 23
B. Growth
Redeployability × Debt enforcement −0.727** −0.323 −0.651** 0.378 −0.599** −0.280
(0.197) (0.303) (0.174) (0.903) (0.187) (0.241)
Diﬀerential eﬀect (percentage points) −0.95 −0.79 −0.85 −0.68 −0.78 −0.69
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hansen J test (p-value) 0.278 0.717 0.271 − 0.138 −
Kleinbergen-Paap statistic 49.72 18.87 29.96 22.94 26.08 36.57
R2 0.498 0.617 0.511 0.581 0.543 0.608
Observations 438 391 502 327 438 391
Countries 18 17 21 14 18 17
Notes: All regressions include both country and industry ﬁxed eﬀects and a constant (coeﬃcient estimates not reported) and are estimated by GMM with Debt enforcement
instrumented by the legal origin of a country’s bankruptcy laws. The dependent variable is: in Panel A, the share of real value added of each 3-digit ISIC industry
to GDP of each country; in Panel B, the annual compounded growth rate in real value added for each 3-digit ISIC industry in each country. Redeployability deﬁned
by expression (3) in the text is the redeployability of real assets owned by each 3-digit ISIC U.S. industry over the speciﬁed time period. Debt enforcement is the
time-invarying country-speciﬁc variable measuring the eﬃciency of debt enforcement procedures (constructed by Djankov et al. (2008)). Additional controls include
the standard determinants of comparative advantage as in Table 3 (Panel A) and the initial industry share corresponding to the dependent variable (Panel B). Initial
GDP is a country’s GDP per capita in 1980. The diﬀerential eﬀect measures in percentage points how much smaller (slower) an industry at the 25th percentile of the
redeployability of real assets would become (grow) with respect to an industry at the 75th percentile when the industries are located in a country at the 25th percentile of
debt enforcement rather than in one at the 75th percentile. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. **: signﬁcant at 1% level. *: signﬁcant
at 5% level.
+: signﬁcant at 10% level.
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0terms is negative and signiﬁcant, giving some credit to the two mechanisms explained above.
The point estimates diﬀer slightly from those in Table 3 as the magnitudes of the variables
measuring debt enforcement and debt market development diﬀer. However, when we include
in addition our interaction term of interest Redeployability × Debt enforcement (columns 3
and 4), we ﬁrst observe that our coeﬃcient of interest is signiﬁcant and has the expected sign.
Second, the interactions involving Financial development become insigniﬁcant. We interpret
this result as evidence that any variation in ﬁnancial development that is uncorrelated to a
variation of debt enforcement quality has no impact on the sensitivity of economic activity to
collateral values.
The role of creditor protection in alleviating ﬁnancial constraints has been emphasized
in the litterature analyzing the eﬀect of legal institutions on economic outcomes. The ﬁrst
studies in this category have focused on the quality of legal rules devised to protect creditors
(see La Porta et al., 1997, 1998). A second and more recent strand of the literature has
analyzed the enforcement of legal rules rather than the law itself (see Djankov et al., 2003,
2008). Accordingly, we disentangle the eﬀects of creditor rights and of the enforcement of
debt contracts on the collateral channel. In column 5 we present the estimates of equation
(1) when we include an interaction between Redeployability × Creditor rights in addition to
our variable of interest. We use Djankov et al. (2007)’s creditor rights index computed for
129 countries over the period 1978 - 2003. This index measures whether diﬀerent powers
are provided by a country’s legal code to a secured creditor in bankruptcy.18 The results
show that the quality of enforcement of secured debt contracts has a signiﬁcant and negative
eﬀect on the sensitivity of economic activity to collateral values. On the contrary, creditor
rights in bankruptcy do not aﬀect signiﬁcantly the collateral channel. Interestingly, this result
complements Bae and Goyal (2009)’s ﬁndings that the enforceability of contracts matters for
bank loan size and maturity whereas creditor rights does not. Accordingly, policymakers
should focus on improving the quality of legal institutions devised to enforce debt contract to
mitigate the sensitive of economic activity to ﬂuctuations in collateral values in their country.
4.4 Robustness Analysis
4.4.1 Standard Robustness Tests
We analyse the robustness of our main result using a series of tests. The estimation results
of several alternative speciﬁcations of equation (1) are reported in Table 6. First, we use
diﬀerent measures of debt enforcement quality. In the ﬁrst two columns, we use the recovery
rate of secured creditors from Djankov et al. (2008) (column 1) and World Bank (2008)
(column 2). An advantage of the second measure is that it is available for a larger sample of
countries, but it corresponds less to our sample period as it has been computed more recently.
Then, we take three measures of the eﬃciency of the judicial system in the collection of an
18We refer the reader to Djankov et al. (2007) for a detailed description of the index.
21Table 5. The Source of the Differential Effect: Legal vs. Financial Development
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. Allocation: Yic = value added to GDP
Redeployability × Debt market size −0.066** −0.027
(0.014) (0.018)
Redeployability × Stock market size −0.070** 0.007
(0.020) (0.013)
Redeployability × Debt enforcement −0.047* −0.082** −0.088**
(0.029) (0.017) (0.022)
Redeployability × Creditor rights 0.003
(0.007)
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hansen J test (p-value) 0.119 0.000 0.296 0.153 0.554
Kleinbergen-Paap statistic 32.74 23.90 131.2 197.7 27.10
R2 0.476 0.471 0.516 0.505 0.506
Observations 1398 1313 1101 1101 1101
Countries 53 49 41 41 41
B. Growth: Yic = real growth of value added
Redeployability × Debt market size −0.268** 0.046
(0.078) (0.154)
Redeployability × Stock market size −0.184* 0.058
(0.083) (0.087)
Redeployability × Debt enforcement −0.481* −0.487** −0.570**
(0.213) (0.132) (0.146)
Redeployability × Creditor rights 0.060
(0.049)
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hansen J test (p-value) 0.119 0.006 0.395 0.492 0.726
Kleinbergen-Paap statistic 135.5 61.26 17.66 79.51 32.63
R2 0.552 0.559 0.599 0.598 0.591
Observations 998 968 829 829 829
Countries 43 41 35 35 35
Notes: All regressions include both country and industry ﬁxed eﬀects and a constant (coeﬃcient estimates not reported) and are
estimated by GMM with Debt enforcement and Creditor rights instrumented by the legal origin of a country’s bankruptcy laws and
the level of ﬁnancial development (Debt market size and Stock market size) instrumented by the legal origin of a country’s commercial
laws. The level of ﬁnancial development is the following: (i) Debt market size deﬁned as the average ratio of private credit by deposit
money bank and other ﬁnancial institutions to GDP in each country between 1981-2000; (ii) Stock market size deﬁned as the ratio
of stock market capitalization to GDP in each country, averaged over the period 1981-2000. The index Creditor rights from Djankov
et al. (2007) measures the legal rights of creditors against a defaulting debtor in each country, averaged over the period 1981-2000.
In Panel A, the dependent variable is the share of real value added of each 3-digit ISIC industry to GDP of each country averaged
over the period 1981-2000. In Panel B, the dependent variable is the annual compounded growth rate in real value added over the
period 1980-2000 for each 3-digit ISIC industry in each country. The main variable of interest Redeployability × Debt enforcement is
deﬁned as in Table 3. Additional controls include the standard determinants of comparative advantage as in Table 3 (Panel A) and
the initial industry share (Panel B). Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. **: signﬁcant at 1% level.
*: signﬁcant at 5% level.
+: signﬁcant at 10% level.
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Time Procedures Costs Investment Output Exports Settler
mortality
BEA 1980s 1990s
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
A. Allocation
Redeployability × Debt enforcement −0.064** −0.083** −0.151** −0.114** −0.182** −0.305** −0.351** −0.546** −0.105** −0.122** −0.069** −0.093**
(0.013) (0.016) (0.040) (0.026) (0.039) (0.097) (0.085) (0.128) (0.021) (0.026) (0.016) (0.018)
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hansen J test (p-value) 0.808 0.340 0.060 0.069 0.212 0.406 0.294 0.219 − 0.806 0.594 0.910
Kleinbergen-Paap statistic 175.6 176.6 95.70 60.82 135.1 97.5 107.4 110.8 92.23 70.52 89.66 121.6
R2 0.517 0.477 0.457 0.496 0.499 0.481 0.655 0.310 0.528 0.600 0.515 0.445
Observations 1101 1373 1101 1101 1101 1028 1101 1108 681 675 1094 1044
Countries 41 52 41 41 41 38 41 41 25 41 41 40
B. Growth
Redeployability × Debt enforcement −0.376** −0.425** −0.977** −0.781** −0.969** −0.441* −0.378** −0.441** −0.395** −0.459** −0.288* −0.582**
(0.089) (0.097) (0.285) (0.277) (0.247) (0.188) (0.099) (0.117) (0.152) (0.130) (0.124) (0.158)
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hansen J test (p-value) 0.538 0.671 0.226 0.083 0.164 0.452 0.782 0.790 − 0.221 0.288 0.483
Kleinbergen-Paap statistic 154.4 330.1 23.89 21.35 92.17 60.5 126.0 206.9 37.67 74.41 100.9 127.4
R2 0.602 0.556 0.575 0.575 0.601 0.625 0.568 0.485 0.661 0.579 0.484 0.591
Observations 829 961 812 812 812 540 844 1495 417 539 1148 850
Countries 35 41 34 34 34 26 35 60 18 35 44 37
Notes: All regressions include both country and industry ﬁxed eﬀects and a constant (coeﬃcient estimates not reported) and are estimated by GMM with Debt enforcement instrumented by the legal origin of a country’s
bankruptcy laws (except in Column 8 where the log of European settler mortality from Acemoglu et al. (2001) is used as an instrument). The dependent variable is the following: (i) Columns 1 to 5, and 9 to 12 in Panel A:
the share of real value added of each 3-digit ISIC (BEA, Column 10) industry to GDP of each country; (ii) Columns 6 to 8 in Panel A: the share of real investment, output, and exports of each 3-digit ISIC industry to total
investment, output and exports resp. in the manufacturing sector of each country; (iii) Columns 1 to 5, and 9 to 12 in Panel B: the annual compounded growth rate in real value added for each 3-digit ISIC (BEA, Column 10)
industry in each country; (iv) Columns 6 to 8 in Panel B: the annual compounded growth rate in real investment, output and exports resp. for each 3-digit ISIC industry in each country. Each dependent variable is averaged
over the following period: (a) 1981-2000 (Columns 1 to 10); (b) 1981-1990 (Column 11); (c) 1991-2000 (Column 12). Redeployability deﬁned by expression (3) in the text is the redeployability of real assets owned by each 3-digit
ISIC (BEA, Column 10) U.S. industry over the speciﬁed time period. Debt enforcement is a time-invarying country-speciﬁc variable and denotes the following: (i) the recovery rate for secured creditors (constructed by Djankov
et al. (2008), Column 1, and by World Bank (2008), Column 2); (ii) the eﬃciency of the judicial system in the collection of an overdue debt measured by (1500 − Time)/1500 in Column 3, (60 − Procedures)/60) in Column 4
and (6 − ln(Costs))/6 in Column 5 (data from World Bank (2004) on time, the number of procedures and the oﬃcial costs to recover debt through courts); (iii) the eﬃciency of debt enforcement procedures (constructed by
Djankov et al. (2008), Columns 6 to 12). Additional controls include the standard determinants of comparative advantage as in Table 3 (Panel A) and the initial industry share corresponding to the dependent variable (Panel
B). Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. **: signﬁcant at 1% level. *: signﬁcant at 5% level.
+: signﬁcant at 10% level.
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3overdue debt from World Bank (2008): the time required for dispute resolution (column 3),
the number of procedures involved in (column 4) and the oﬃcial costs of going through court
procedures (column 5). We scale each variable so that all values lie in the unit interval, with a
higher value representing a better judicial quality, in order to facilitate the comparison of the
estimated coeﬃcients. We see in the results that the estimated coeﬃcients remain negative
and signiﬁcant at the 1% level for all alternative measures in both the allocation and growth
regressions.
We have argued that the dependence of an industry’s investment capacity on the collateral
value of its pledgeable real assets is underlying the sensitivity of economic activity to collateral
values. We provide evidence for our argument by running the baseline regression with industry
investment instead of value added as a dependent variable. The results in column 6 show that
weaker debt enforcement signiﬁcantly exacerbates the sensitivity of industry investment to
collateral values. In columns 7 and 8, we additionally use domestic output and exports
respectively as alternative measures of economic activity. The results show that domestic
production and the pattern of trade also are more sensitive to collateral values in countries
with a lower quality of debt enforcement. This result complements Nunn (2007) who ﬁnds
that contract enforcement quality is a source of comparative advantage in trade. Next, in
column 9, we use the settler mortality in former European colonies from Acemoglu et al.
(2001) instead of the legal origin of bankruptcy law to instrument our institutional variable.
This results in a large drop in the number of countries included in the regression, but does
not aﬀect our basic result. In column 10, we aggregate sectoral data to match the BEA
industry Code, on which our redeployability index is based. Doing so allows to have a single
redeployability value for each industry. Finally, we analyze the robustness of our results over
diﬀerent time periods. In columns 11 and 12, we report our estimates of equation (1) for two
sub-periods, 1981-1990 and 1991-2000. Our results are qualitatively and quantitavely similar
for the alternative industry classiﬁcation and the two diﬀerent time periods.
4.4.2 Testing Alternative Explanations
The allocation and growth of economic activity may in principle be aﬀected by many chan-
nels. Our results could be misleading if we omit to control for signiﬁcant channels that are
correlated with our interaction term, since the latter would absorb all the eﬀect of the omit-
ted variables. We therefore include a series of alternative explanations to test whether our
results are spuriously driven by the correlation of our interaction term with these alternative
determinants of economic activity at the sectoral level.
We explore three alternative explanations for our results. First, we argue that the pro-
duction of complex goods involves the use of speciﬁc assets. For example, in the O-ring
production function of Kremer (1993) the elaboration of more complex products is associated
with a larger number of diﬀerentiated tasks to be performed which likely requires more spe-
ciﬁc assets. Moreover, the degree of complexity of a product determines the need for good
24institutions to enforce contracts, as it is harder to write a complete sale contract for a com-
plex product than for a simple one (Berkowitz et al., 2006; Levchenko, 2007). We account
for this channel in several ways. We use the Herﬁndhal index of intermediate goods from
Cowan and Neut (2007) as a direct proxy for product complexity. We also argue that ﬁrms
producing more complex goods are more intensive in R&D. These ﬁrms are more dependent
on the availability of skilled workers which in a cross-country perspective is positively corre-
lated with the quality of institutions. A production process that involves more tasks is also
likely to last longer and thus shift cash-ﬂow earnings later in time, increasing the need to
use external ﬁnance. In columns 1 to 3 of Table 7, we show that even though these industry
characteristics aﬀect the allocation of economic activity, their inclusion does not diminish the
relevance of our channel. In column 4, we use a diﬀerent approach which consists in adding to
our baseline speciﬁcation the interaction between average PPP-adjusted GDP per worker and
industry dummies. As worker productivity is positively correlated with product complexity,
country’s GDP per worker should be a good proxy for the ability of a country to produce
complex goods. Adding these 28 extra regressors therefore allows to control for the product
complexity channel in an unrestricted way. We see that our coeﬃcient of interest becomes
slightly lower in absolute terms in the allocation regression, but remains highly signiﬁcant,
whereas our growth results remain unaﬀected.
Second, it is possible that ﬁrms using speciﬁc real assets also need relationship-speciﬁc
inputs. In that case, our measure of real asset redeployability would capture the need for con-
tract enforcement. As shown by Nunn (2007), industries which rely on relationship-speciﬁc
investments beneﬁt more from better contract enforcement institutions. To account for this
channel, we add an interaction term of Contract intensity × Rule of law in column 5. More-
over, as the quality of diﬀerent institutions is highly correlated within a country, our variable
measuring the quality of debt enforcement could capture the eﬀect of the quality of institu-
tions in general. To take care of that, we add an interaction between our industry-speciﬁc
variable and the initial level of a country’s GDP, which is highly correlated with the quality
of institutions. We see that our results are not aﬀected qualitatively and quantitatively by
including these alternative channels.
Eventually, our interaction term could be capturing a general (proportional) eﬀect of good
institutions on economic activity if the economic outlook of the diﬀerent industries is corre-
lated with the redeployability of real assets. We would then expect industries with better
economic opportunities to perform relatively better in countries with good institutions, in-
dependently of our channel. To account for this possibility, we add to our regression an
interaction term between the economic activity in a benchmark country, and ﬁnancial devel-
opment in column 9 and initial GDP per capita in column 10. As in Fisman and Love (2007),
we consider that the industrial economic activity in the U.S. economy is the benchmak by
representing the global economic opportunities. Overall, we see that our coeﬃcient of inter-
est remains negative and signiﬁcant at the 1% level in 13 out of 16 regressions (5% in the
25Table 7. Testing Alternative Explanations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A. Allocation: Yic = value added to GDP
Redeployability × Debt enforcement −0.040* −0.073** −0.061** −0.056* −0.063** −0.056* −0.040** −0.063**
(0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.023) (0.016) (0.024) (0.015) (0.016)
Product complexity × Rule of Law 0.009**
(0.002)
R&D intensity × Human capital 0.004**
(0.001)
External ﬁnance dependance × Financial development 0.010**
(0.002)
Industry dummy × GDP per worker −
−
Contract intensity × Rule of law 0.011**
(0.002)
Redeployability × Initial GDP per capita −0.012+
(0.007)
Benchmark allocation × Financial development 0.760**
(0.120)
Benchmark allocation × Initial GDP per capita 0.224**
(0.032)
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hansen J test (p-value) 0.446 0.803 0.809 0.892 0.560 0.910 0.076 0.952
Kleinbergen-Paap statistic 22.69 103.0 56.36 61.60 45.80 51.34 54.86 90.31
R2 0.530 0.517 0.520 0.574 0.520 0.519 0.542 0.539
Observations 1101 1101 1101 1101 1101 1101 1101 1101
Countries 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41
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6Table 7. (Continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
B. Growth: Yic = real growth of value added
Redeployability × Debt enforcement −0.409** −0.373** −0.384** −0.427** −0.401** −0.422** −0.400** −0.411**
(0.105) (0.114) (0.107) (0.144) (0.106) (0.150) (0.102) (0.099)
Product complexity × Rule of Law 0.030
(0.022)
R&D intensity × Human capital 0.009
(0.008)
External ﬁnance dependance × Financial development 0.031+
(0.018)
Industry dummy × GDP per worker −
−
Contract intensity × Rule of law 0.014
(0.013)
Redeployability × Initial GDP per capita 0.013
(0.050)
Benchmark growth × Financial development 0.111
(0.243)
Benchmark growth × Initial GDP per capita 0.281**
(0.089)
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hansen J test (p-value) 0.272 0.233 0.406 0.359 0.059 0.351 0.103 0.358
Kleinbergen-Paap statistic 11.32 91.09 46.38 42.97 81.23 48.80 47.44 105.5
R2 0.595 0.618 0.601 0.636 0.597 0.601 0.626 0.633
Observations 829 754 829 829 829 829 788 788
Countries 35 32 35 35 35 35 35 35
Notes: All regressions include both country and industry ﬁxed eﬀects and a constant (coeﬃcient estimates not reported) and are estimated by GMM with
Debt enforcement instrumented by the legal origin of a country’s bankruptcy laws. In Panel A, the dependent variable is the average share of each 3-digit ISIC
industry’s real value added to each country’s GDP over the period 1981-2000. In Panel B, the dependent variable is the annual compounded growth rate in real value
added over the period 1980-2000 for each 3-digit ISIC industry in each country. The main variable of interest Redeployability ×Debt enforcement is deﬁned as in Table
3. Each interaction term is the product of the corresponding two variables. The industry-speciﬁc variables, which are built using U.S. data, are the following: (i)
Product complexity is the Herﬁndhal index of intermediate input use from Cowan and Neut (2007); (ii) R&D intensity is the ratio of R&D expenditures over capital
expenditures; (iii) External ﬁnance dependance is the median ratio of capital expenditures minus cash-ﬂows from operations to capital expenditures; (iv) Industry
dummy is a dummy variable for each 3-digit ISIC industry; (v) Contract intensity reports the industry share of intermediate inputs that cannot be bought on organized
exchanges and are not reference-priced; (vi) Benchmark economic activity averaged over the period 1980-2000 measures the industry value added to GDP in United
States (Panel A) and the annual compounded growth rate in industry real value added in United States (Panel B). The country-speciﬁc variables are the following: (a)
Rule of law measures the extent to which agents have conﬁdence in and abide by the rules of society in 1996; (b) Human capital is log of the mean average years of
schooling over the period 1981-2000; (c) Financial development is the average ratio of private credit by deposit money bank and other ﬁnancial institutions to GDP in
each country between 1981-2000; (d) GDP per worker is the log of the mean of real GDP per worker over the period 1981-2000; (e) Initial GDP per capita is the log of
real GDP per capita in 1980. Additional controls include the standard determinants of comparative advantage as in Table 3 (Panel A) and the initial industry share
(Panel B). Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. **: signﬁcant at 1% level. *: signﬁcant at 5% level. +: signﬁcant at 10% level.
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7remaining cases) when the alternative channels are accounted for. Moreover, the coeﬃcients
are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the coeﬃcient estimated in the baseline regression.
5 A Stylized Model
In this section, we propose a stylized model of debt ﬁnancing with repudiation and renegoti-
ation to rationalize our empirical ﬁndings and in particular illustrate how a country’s ability
to enforce debt contracts aﬀects the sensitivity of economic activity to collateral values.
5.1 The Environment
The world economy consists of multiple closed countries in which production is realized in
multiple sectors. Each sector is represented by an entrepreneur who incurs debt from com-
petitive lenders to invest in real assets Kt. The entrepreneur has access to a production
technology that returns xA (x > 1) per unit of real assets invested, unless the real assets are
liquidated before completion of the project in which case it only returns A. Lenders have
access to funds at gross interest rate R.19 All agents are inﬁnitely lived.
The framework contains two frictions. First, debt enforcement is imperfect due to standard
moral hazard considerations. The entrepreneur may default on the loan and divert cash
ﬂows. The lender negotiates under court’s supervision an amount that the entrepreneur has
to repay. The parameter ρ ∈ [0,1] captures the lender’s bargaining power in debt renegotiation
and indexes countries. Second, the real assets operated by an entrepreneur are imperfectly
redeployable to other entrepreneurs. The liquidation value of a real asset is a fraction τ ∈ [0,1]
of its fundamental value, which we assume to be 1. Entrepreneurs are indexed by τ.
We make the following two assumptions.
Assumption 1. A > R
Assumption 2. (x − 1)A > 1
Assumption 1 ensures that investing funds in a project is more proﬁtable than lending it
even for a defaulting entrepreneur. Assumption 2 indicates that liquidation is ineﬃcient even
for sectors whose real assets are liquidated at their fundamental values (i.e. τ = 1).
At the beginning of period t, the entrepreneur invests her wealth Wt in real assets kc
t. Then
the entrepreneur and the lender sign a debt contract deﬁned by the triplet (rt,Dt,kc
t), where rt
is the gross lending rate, Dt the amount of debt and kc
t the quantity of collateralized assets.20
19R would be the world interest rate in a small open economy framework.
20The assumption that only the assets ﬁnanced with internal funds are collateralized can be rationalized in
several ways: i) by assuming that installing capital takes time and is costly and that secured credit is extended
only against installed capital and/or contracting is costly. In this context a standard credit multiplier requires
an inﬁnite number of debt contracts and capital installation. ii) by assuming that the production technology
requires ﬁrst an investment in tangible capital in order to run intangible capital, the latter being much more
productive than tangible capital but not pledgeable as collateral. However, even in the framework with an
inﬁnite sequence of contracts, we would still obtain Propsition 1 under reasonable assumptions.
28The entrepreneur invests the external funds Dt in real assets kt, runs the project of total size
Kt = Dt + Wt and obtains a cash ﬂow of AKt. In the middle of period t, the entrepreneur
decides whether or not to meet his debt obligations. In case of default, the entrepreneur and
the lender may renegotiate the debt contract under the courts’ supervision. If the parties do
not ﬁnd an agreement, courts seize the collateralized assets and transfer them to the lender
who obtains τkc
t, while the entrepreneur absconds with cash ﬂow AKt and gets (x − 1)Akt
from the uncollateralized part of the assets. In case of debt repayment, the project continues
at full size and returns the proﬁt income xAKt −rtDt. At the end of period t, the real assets
fully depreciate and the entrepreneur saves a ﬁxed fraction β of her end-of-period wealth.21
5.2 The Collateral Channel under Imperfect Debt Enforcement
In the middle of each period, entrepreneurs are left with three alternatives. The ﬁrst one is
debt repayement as speciﬁed in the debt contract. The second one is default. The third one is
debt renegotiation under courts’ supervision. As in Jermann and Quadrini (2009), we assume
that in renegotiation the entrepreneur and the lender bargain over an amount et to be paid
by the entrepreneur to avoid an ineﬃcient liquidation. The surplus of reaching an agreement
is (x − 1)AWt − et for the entrepreneur and et − τWt for the lender.22 We assume that the
bargaining power of the lender is ρ. Therefore the weaker debt enforcement, the lower the
bargaining power of the lender in the debt renegotiation process under courts’ supervision.
The Nash bargaining problem solves:
max
et≥0
[et − τWt]ρ[(x − 1)AWt − et]1−ρ
The payment agreed upon the contractual parties under courts’ supervision is:
et = ρ(x − 1)AWt + (1 − ρ)τWt (5)
Proposition 1 describes the credit multiplier arising in this frameowrk and highlights the
collateral channel under imperfect debt enforcement:
Proposition 1. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the entrepreneur in sector τ in country ρ invest
Kt = ν(τ,ρ)Wt in real assets with a credit multiplier given by
ν(τ,ρ) = 1 +
ρ(x − 1)A + (1 − ρ)τ
R
(6)
The credit multiplier features a collateral channel as sectors with a high collateral value exhibit
21Therefore the entrepreneur consumes a ﬁxed fraction 1 − β. This assumption can be rationalized with log
preferences. It is well known that inﬁnitely-lived agents with log utility have a saving function of the form
St = βπt where β stands for the time discount factor.
22The entrepreneur obtains xAKt − et in case of agreement and AKt + (x − 1)Akt = A(Kt − kt) + xAkt
without any agreement under Assumption 2. As Wt = Kt − kt, the surplus of reaching an agreement follows.
29higher investment per unit of internal funds. Moreover, the collateral channel is stronger in
countries with weak debt enforcement.
Proof. Under Assumption 2, the resulting liquidation of the ﬁrm in case of default triggers
a loss of value for the entrepreneur (as (x − 1)AWt > et) and for the lender (as et > τWt).
Therefore both parties have an incentive to renegotiate the debt contract under courts’ super-
vision in case of default. However, an entrepreneur τ renegotiates only when it is a proﬁtable
option, that is when the following incentive-compatiblity constraint is violated:
xAKt − rtDt ≥ xAKt − et (IC)
The left-hand side of (IC) is the proﬁt income of the project in case of debt repayment.
The right-hand side is the return of the project net of the agreed payment under courts’
supervision. Therefore, if (IC) is satisﬁed, the entrepreneur always repays the competitive
lender who charges a lending rate rt = R (zero-proﬁt condition). Under Assumption 1, (IC)





R ≥ 0, there follows the collateral channel. However the collateral
channel is stronger in countries with weak debt enforcement as
∂2ν(τ,ρ)
∂τ∂ρ = − 1
R < 0. ￿
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is straightforward. Entrepreneurs ﬁnd optimal to rene-
gotiate the debt contract. Firstly, the lender provides funds up to the net present value of
payment agreed under courts’ supervision (i.e. et
R) to deter such opportunistic behavior. Sec-
ondly, entrepeneurs with a high collateral value have to pay more to lenders in order to reach
an agreement. As a result, they have larger debt and investment capacity (
∂ν(τ,ρ)
∂τ ≥ 0). How-





∂τ with ρ > ρ or equivalently
∂2ν(τ,ρ)
∂τ∂ρ < 0).
We now investigate the eﬀect of the collateral channel under imperfect debt enforcement on
economic activity. Speciﬁcally, we study the change in sensitivity of industry allocation and
growth to collateral values when debt enforcement becomes less eﬃcient. The value added of
sector τ located in country ρ is the proﬁt income of the project:
πt(τ,ρ) = xAKt − RDt = [(xA − R)ν(τ,ρ) + R]Wt (7)
from Proposition 1. As the entrepreneur τ saves a ﬁxed fraction β of her end-of-period
wealth (7), she has access to internal funds Wt = βπt(τ,ρ) = β[(xA − R)ν(τ,ρ) + R]Wt−1 at
the beginning of period t. Therefore the growth in value added of sector τ located in country




= β[(xA − R)ν(τ,ρ) + R]
30Let’s deﬁne the share of industry τ in the economy as st(τ,ρ) ≡
π(τ,ρ)
Yt(ρ) where GDP in
country ρ is the sum of value added in all sectors given by Yt(ρ) =
R 1
0 π(τ,ρ)dτ. The change
in sensitivity of sectoral allocation and growth to collateral values when debt enforcement is



















From Proposition 1, both expressions are negative.23 Therefore Proposition 1 has the
following implication:
Corollary 1. An industry with a low collateral value represents a relatively smaller share of
the economy and grows more slowly in countries characterized by weak debt enforcement.
Proposition 1 states that the collateral channel is stronger when debt enforcement is weak.
Indeed entrepreneurs with a low collateral value are more constrained in countries with weak
debt enforcement which implies that they generate less proﬁt out of internal funds (allocation
eﬀect) and as a result less investment next period (growth eﬀect).
5.3 Discussion
5.3.1 Ability to Repossess and Unsecured Lending
A common feature in models with credit constraint is to consider the ability to repossess real
assets in case of default as the enforcement parameter. Suppose the same environment as
before except that repossessing the capital of a defaulted entrepreneur is costly. For every
unit of seized capital by courts, the lender ends up with a fraction θ ∈ [0,1] of it. The balance
is lost in the repossessing process. The credit multiplier is modiﬁed as follows:
ν(τ,ρ,θ) = 1 +
ρ(x − 1)A + (1 − ρ)θτ
R
(8)
If we consider the case where the lender has no bargaining power in debt renegotiation
under courts’ supervision (i.e. ρ = 0), standard credit constraints are derived from (8).
For instance, Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) consider the perfect enforcement case (i.e. θ =
1), while in Eisfeldt and Rampini (2007) and Eisfeldt and Rampini (2009), θ lies in the
unit inerval. If θ is interpreted as the debt enforcement parameter instead of ρ, the result
on the eﬀect of the quality of debt enforcement on the collateral channel is reversed. The





∂ρ > 0 and
∂2πt(τ,ρ)
∂τ∂ρ < 0 using the proﬁt income (7) and the credit multiplier
(6).
31is straightforward. Sectors with high collateral value agree upon a relatively larger payment
under courts’ supervision when courts are able to repossess a larger fraction of real assets
in case of default. Therefore entrepreneurs with high collateral value contract relatively
more debt in countries with eﬃcient debt enforcement. In other words, debt enforcement
complements the collateral channel.
5.3.2 Volatility and Development
In this subsection we show the implication of Proposition 1 on the relationship between
macroeconomic volatility and development. Suppose that the country ρ is populated by
homogenous industries characterized by a long-term collateral value τ.24 Developing countries
are indexed by a low ρ since it is well known that they are institutional laggards. We assume
exogenous shocks ǫ > 0 to the long-term collateral value. Collateral value is equal to τ − ǫ
or τ + ǫ with equal probability. The expression for the volatility at the country level can be
written as:
V (ρ) ≡ E[gt(τ,ρ)2] − {E[gt(τ,ρ)]}2 =
1
4
[gt(τ + ǫ,ρ) − gt(τ − ǫ,ρ)]2



















∂ρ from Proposition 1. Therefore,
Proposition 1 has the following implication on the relationship between volatility and devel-
opment:
Corollary 2. Developing countries are more volatile since debt contracts are weakly enforced.
This result is in line with Acemoglu et al. (2003) and Koren and Tenreyro (2007). Ace-
moglu et al. (2003) ﬁnd that the development of institutions is the driver in the reduction
of macroeconomic volatility, while Koren and Tenreyro (2007) show that 50 percent of the
diﬀerence in volatility between developed and developing countries is explained by diﬀerences
in country-speciﬁc volatility. The intution behind these empirical results is straightforward if
recessions and booms are interpreted as the the two states. As in Shleifer and Vishny (1992)
and Benmelech and Bergman (2011), the collateral value is below its long-term value τ in a
recession, while the opposite occurs in a period of boom. Therefore, the boom and bust cycle
would lead to more volatility in developing countries as sectoral growth is more sensitive to
change in collateral value when debt enforcement is weak.
24With this interpretation, we develop a measure for τ in the empirical section.
326 Conclusion
This paper has provided evidence that a country’s ability to enforce debt contract aﬀects the
sensitivity of economic activity to collateral values. Using a novel industry-speciﬁc measure of
real assets’ redeployability as proxy for collateral liquidation values, we ﬁnd that the diﬀerences
in size and growth between sectors with high and low collateral values are larger in countries
with weaker debt enforcement institutions. Our estimates suggest that the diﬀerential eﬀect is
sizeable. This ﬁnding is robust using controls for standard determinants of economic activity,
instrumental variables and a battery of robustness checks.
We have also shown that the basic source of variation of the collateral channel across
countries is debt enforcement in the sense that ﬁnancial development has no impact on the
collateral channel beyond the correlation with debt enforcement. This suggests that a policy-
maker interested in reducing macroeconomic volatility arising from ﬂuctuations in collateral
values should focus on improving the quality of legal institutions rather than the level of ﬁ-
nancial development alone. Our empirical investigation has highlighted some general aspects
of the bankruptcy procedure that could be improved: reducing the time to resolve the dispute
and the number of procedure and decreasing the costs occured in the procedure. How these
improvements can be achieved in practice is however beyond the scope of our paper.
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A Sources and Description of Data
Redeployability of Real Assets. The Detailed Fixed Assets Tables are available on
the website of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://www.bea.gov/national/
FA2004/index.asp). BEA provides data in current value on investment expenditures over
the period 1901-2009 and on capital stock over the period 1947-2009 for 74 private nonresiden-
tial real assets for each of the 63 U.S. industries (3-digit level of disaggregation; 2002 NAICS
classiﬁcation). 42 assets fall into the category ”Equipment” while the category ”Structures”
contains 32 types of capital. We use the tables providing for each industry i investment expen-
ditures in used and new real assets of type a (Ea,i,t) and stock of asset a (Ka,i,t), both expressed
in time t current million dollars value. To obtain Liquiditya,i, we sum the current-value in-
vestment expenditures in capital a of industry i over the period 1981-2000 (
P2000
t=1981 Ea,i,t)
and then divide it by the sum of industry i’s total current-value investment expenditures over




t=1981 Ea,i,t). To get the asset share ωa,i, we sum the current-value
capital stock for real asset a of industry i over the period 1981-2000 (
P2000
t=1981 Ka,i,t) and then





t=1981 Ka,i,t). We repeat the procedure for each asset and industry considered in the
tables.
The Annual Capital Expenditure Survey from the U.S. Census Bureau provide data over
the period 1996-2006 on investment expenditures on used capital (Eused
a,i,t ) and on new capi-
tal (Enew
a,i,t) expressed in time t current million dollars value (avalaible on the webpage http:
//www.census.gov/econ/aces). The database covers the same U.S. sectors as in the Detailed
Fixed Assets Tables (1987 SIC classiﬁcation for the period 1994-1997; 1997 NAICS classiﬁca-
tion for the period 1998-2006), but only for two broad categories of real assets, namely ”Equip-
ment” and ”Structures”. We convert the 1994-1997 data from the 1987 SIC classiﬁcation into
the 1997 NAICS classiﬁcation using the detailed concordance available on the CENSUS web-
site (http://www.census.gov/eos/www/naics/concordances/concordances.html). To ob-
tain Nonspeciﬁcitya,i, we sum the expenditures on used capital of industry i for category a
of real assets over 1996-2006 (
P2006
t=1996 Eused
a,i,t ) and then divide it by the sum of total capital





The redeployability of assets used by industry i is reported according to BEA industry
codes based on the NAICS classiﬁcation. In order to match our measure of redeployability to
the ISIC rev. 2 classiﬁcation, we ﬁrst use a concordance from NAICS02 (6-digits) to ISIC rev.
3 (4-digits) and then another one from ISIC rev. 3 to ISIC rev. 2 (3-digit), both available
on the United Nations Statistics Division’s website (http://unstats.un.org/unsd/class/).
We attribute to each ISIC rev. 2 industry the value of redeployability of the BEA industry
with which it shares the most NAICS02 categories.
34Table A1. Correlations between Redeployability of Different Decades





Redep90s 0.99 0.91 1
0.99 0.91 1
Redep80s 0.98 0.93 0.95 1
0.98 0.95 0.96 1
Redep70s 0.92 0.99 0.90 0.93 1
0.93 0.99 0.92 0.95 1
Redep60s 0.92 0.97 0.90 0.92 0.95 1
0.91 0.97 0.89 0.94 0.96 1
Notes: Spearman’s rank correlation coeﬃcients are reported on ﬁrst lines while second lines refer to Pearson’s
correlation coeﬃcients. The null hypothesis of independance is rejected below the 1% level of signiﬁcance for
Spearman’s correlations. The Pearson’s correlations are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero below the 1% level.
The redeployability of real assets Redepi,t deﬁned in (3) has been calculated over diﬀerent decades t for each
industry i (manufacturing and non-manufacturing) present in the Detailed Fixed Assets Table from BEA. We
use Speciﬁcitya,i computed for the period 1994-2006 since it is the most recent coverage that ACES database
provides.
We also compute Liquiditya,i and ωa,i for diﬀerent periods of time using the same procedure
as the one decribed above to get a correlation matrix of redeployability for the whole sample
of industries (manufacturing and non-manufacturing) across time. The correlation matrix is
displayed in Table A1. Note that the Spearman’s and Pearson’s correlation coeﬃcients are of
the same order of magnitude when only manufacturing industries are considered.
Note that in standard robustness tests (Table 7), we use the redeployability index Redep80s
(Redep90s) when we consider the time period 1980s in column 10 (1990s in column 11).
Economic Outcomes. In our standard regressions, economic outcomes are measured using
production data provided by Nicita and Olarreaga (2007) for 28 manufacturing sectors over
the period 1976-2004. The data is originally from United Nations Industrial Development
Organization (UNIDO) and is reported according to the 3-digit ISIC Rev. 2 classiﬁcation.
Value added is reported by UNIDO in thousend current US dollars. We divide value added
by [(CGDPct/RGDPct)] × (Pct/100) to express value added in constant international dollars
of industry i in country c at year t (vaict). This deﬂation procedures is from Levchenko
et al. (2009). Data on per capita nominal GDP (CGDPct) and real GDP (RGDPct) in
international dollars, on the price level of GDP (Pct) and population (POPct, in thousands)
are taken from the Penn World Table (Heston et al. (2006)). Value added to GDP is the
average share of real value added to real GDP of industry i in country c for the period
1981-2000 [Yic =
P2000
t=1981(vaict/RGDPct × POPct)/20]. Real growth in value added is the
annual compounded growth rate in real value added of industry i in country c over the period
351980-2000 [Yic = (logvaic,2000 − logvaic,1980)/20].
In standard robustness tests (Table 6), we use gross ﬁxed capital formation and output,
which represents the value of goods produced in a year, whether sold or stocked, both
from the UNIDO database. We apply the same transformations than for value added to
obtain investment and output in constant international dollars. In the allocation regres-
sion, the dependent variable is the share of invesment (output) in industry i and country
c to total investment (output) in the manufacturing sector of country c averaged over the
years 1980-2000. Growth in investment (output) is the annual compounded growth rate
in investment (output) of industry i in country c over the period 1980-2000. In column
8, we use export data from Feenstra et al. (2005) (4-digit level of disaggregation; SITC
rev. 2 classiﬁcation). We convert the export data in the SITC rev. 2 classiﬁcation into
the ISIC rev. 2 classiﬁcation using the concordance produced by Muendler (available at
http://www.econ.ucsd.edu/muendler/html/resource.html). In the allocation regression,
the dependent variable is the share of exports in industry i and country c to total exports in
country c averaged over the years 1980-2000. Growth in exports is the annual compounded
growth rate in exports of industry i in country c over the period 1980-2000.
Debt Enforcement and Financial Development. The eﬃciency of debt enforcement
is taken from Djankov et al. (2008). In this study, the authors have questionned insolvency
practioneers from 88 countries to describe in detail how debt enforcement in their country
will proceed with respect to an identical ﬁrm that is about to default on its debt. The ﬁrm is
a hotel with a given number of employees, capital and ownership structure, value as a going
concern and value if sold piecemeal. The value of the hotel is 100 (equal to the value of
debt) if it kept as going concern but decreases to 70 if it sold piecemeal. Debt enforcement
eﬃciency is deﬁned as the present value of the terminal value of the ﬁrm minus bankruptcy
costs. From collected responses of practioners, Debt enforcement eﬃciency is computed as
[100×GC +70×(1−GC)−100×c]/(1+r)t where GC equals one if the hotel continues as
a going concern and zero otherwise, c is the cost of debt enforcement procedures, t the time
to resolve insolvency, and r the nominal lending rate prevailing in the country.
In standard robustness tests (Table 6), we use alternative measures of debt enforcement.
First, we consider the recovery rate for secured creditors constructed as the eﬃciency of debt
enforcement and deﬁned as [100×GC +70×(1−GC)−12×(P −1)−100×c]/(1+r)t where
P stands for the order of priority in which claims are paid. The measure of recovery rate is
from Djankov et al. (2008) in column 1 and from World Bank (2008) in column 2. Then we
use data from World Bank (2008) on the eﬃciency of the judicial system in the collection of
an overdue debt: the time required for dispute resolution, the number of procedures involved
in and the oﬃcial costs of going through court procedures. As in Nunn (2007), we change and
normalize each variable in order to get an alternative measure of debt enforcement increasing
in it and ranging from zero to one [(1500−Time)/1500 in Column 3, (60−Procedures)/60)
36in Column 4 and (6 − ln(Costs))/6] in Column 5.
We consider two types of variable as a proxy for the level of ﬁnancial development. Debt
market size in period t is deﬁned as 0.5×{[Ft/Pe
t +Ft−1/Pe
t−1]/[GDPt/Pa
t ]} where F is credit
by deposit money bank and other ﬁnancial institutions to the private sectors (lines 22d +
42d), GDP is line 99b, Pe is end- of period CPI (line 64) and Pa is the average CPI for
the give year. Data come from International Financial Statistics (IFS). Stock market size in
period t taken from Beck et al. (2009) is calculated as debt market size with F deﬁned as the
value of listed shares. We average each variable over the period 1981-2000. The legal origin
of a country’s bankruptcy laws from Djankov et al. (2008) and the log of European settler
mortality in former colonies from Acemoglu et al. (2001) are used as an instrument for debt
enforcement, while the instrument for the level of ﬁnancial development is the legal origin of
commercial laws from La Porta et al. (1998).
Creditor rights is the mean value over the period 1981-2000 of the creditor rights index from
Djankov et al. (2007).
Standard Controls and Alternative Channels. The Initial industry share is computed
using the UNIDO dataset from Nicita and Olarreaga (2007), and deﬁned as the share of the




Industry-specﬁc variables. The sector factor intensities Capital intensity, Skill intensity,
Natural resources intensity intensity and ﬁnancial characteristics are taken from Table 1 in
Braun (2005). Note that Tangibility of assets is the median ratio of net property, plant and
equipment to total assets over U.S. ﬁrms in industry i, while External ﬁnance dependence is
the median ratio of capital expenditures minus cash-ﬂows from operations to total capital
expenditures over U.S. ﬁrms in industry i. Considering other industry-speciﬁc variables,
R&D intensity is the ratio of R&D expenditures over total capital expenditures, Depreciation
the industry rate of capital depreciation and Obsolescence the embodied technical change in
industry capital based on Cummins and Violante (2002). These variables are from Ilyina and
Samaniego (2011). Product complexity is the Herﬁndhal index of intermediate input use from
Cowan and Neut (2007). Contract intensity comes from Levchenko (2010) and reports the
industry share of intermediate inputs that cannot be bought on organized exchanges and is
not reference-priced. Benchmark economic activity is computed using the UNIDO dataset
from Nicita and Olarreaga (2007). In the allocation regression, it measures the value added
to GDP of industry i in United States, while in the growth regression, it measures the annual
compounded growth rate in industry real value added in United States. Both variables are
averaged of the period 1980-2000.
Country-specﬁc variables. The stock of physical capital per worker in each country is
constructed using the perpetual inventory method described in Hall and Jones (1999) where
the investment data and the number of workers for each country c are taken from Penn World
37Tables (Heston et al., 2006). Human capital is computed from the average years of schooling
over the population in a given country using data from Barro and Lee (2001) with concave
Mincerian returns to education. The computational method is from Caselli (2005). Data
on aggregate natural resources endowment per capita are obtained from World Bank (1997).
Capital and Skill are the log of the mean physical capital per worker and the mean human
capital in country c for the period 1981-2000, respectively. Natural resources is the log of
natural resources per capita. Rule of law ranging from -2.5 to 2.5 is computed from survey
data by Kaufmann et al. (2009) and measures the extent to which agents have conﬁdence in
and abide by the rules of society in 1996. Initial GDP per capita is the log of real GDP per
capita in 1980, while GDP per worker is the log of the mean of real GDP per worker over
period 1981-2000. Data are from the Penn World Tables (Heston et al., 2006).
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Table A2. Summary Statistics
Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. Obs.
A.1 Allocation regression variables
Mean value added to GDP (1981-2000) 0.0064 0.0078 0 0.0628 1101
Redeployability × Debt enforcement 0.4019 0.1996 0.0402 0.8496 1101
Redeployability × Debt market size 0.3466 0.242 0.0272 1.4477 1398
Redeployability × Stock market size 0.2484 0.2517 0.0059 1.2679 1313
Redeployability × Creditor rights 1.3209 0.8087 0 3.5583 1101
Capital intensity × Capital 1.083 0.5773 0.2553 3.3159 1101
Skill intensity × Skill 2.2389 0.7886 0.7151 5.3224 1101
Natural resources intensity × Natural resources 2.1556 3.8282 0 10.8413 1101
A.2 Growth regression variables
Real growth rate of value added (1980-2000) 0.0218 0.0546 -0.2215 0.2221 829
Redeployability × Debt enforcement 0.4624 0.1904 0.0402 0.8549 829
Redeployability × Debt market size 0.4411 0.2560 0.0895 1.4477 998
Redeployability × Stock market size 0.3145 0.3086 0.0061 1.8655 968
Redeployability × Creditor rights 1.4638 0.7974 0 3.5583 829
Initial share of value added to GDP (1980) 0.0394 0.0455 0.0002 0.5238 829
B. Country-speciﬁc variablesa
Eﬃciency of debt enforcement 0.5695 0.2656 0.066 0.9610 51
British legal origin (bankruptcy law) 0.2941 0.4602 0 1 51
French legal origin (bankruptcy law) 0.5686 0.5002 0 1 51
German legal origin (bankruptcy law) 0.0588 0.2376 0 1 51
Nordic legal origin (bankruptcy law) 0.0784 0.2715 0 1 51
Mean private credit to GDP (1981-2000) 0.5095 0.3535 0.0446 1.6274 67
Stock market capitalization to GDP (1981-2000) 0.3659 0.4116 0.0097 2.0971 61
British legal origin (common law) 0.3115 0.4669 0 1 61
French legal origin (civil law) 0.5246 0.5035 0 1 61
German legal origin (civil law) 0.0656 0.2496 0 1 61
Scandinavian legal origin (civil law) 0.0656 0.2496 0 1 61
Socialist legal origin 0.0328 0.1796 0 1 61
Creditor Rights 1.9608 1.1663 0 4 51
Log of mean physical capital per worker (1981-2000) 15.6618 0.8713 14.1073 16.9612 41
Mean human capital (1981-2000) 2.2498 0.4979 1.4253 3.2144 41
Log of natural resources per capita 8.8322 0.9051 6.9276 10.8413 41
C. Industry-speciﬁc variables
Redeployability 0.7173 0.0688 0.6093 0.8896 28
Tangibility 0.2977 0.1392 0.0745 0.6708 28
Capital intensity 0.0695 0.0376 0.0181 0.1955 28
Skill intensity 0.9995 0.2771 0.5017 1.6558 28
Natural resources intensity 0.25 0.441 0 1 28
Notes: a: Summary statistics refer to the countries included in either the allocation or the growth regressions.
39C Samples
Table A3. Sample in Allocation Regressions
Country Number of Country Number of Country Number of
industries industries industries
Argentina 28 Greece 28 New Zealand 28
Australia 28 Guatemala 28 Omana 27
Austria 28 Hong Konga 27 Panamaa 27
Bulgariaa 28 Honduras 26 Peru 28
Brazil 13 Hungarya 28 Philippines 28
Botswanaa 5 Indonesia 28 Polanda 28
Canada 28 Ireland 26 Portugal 28
Switzerland 5 Irana 28 Romaniaa 28
Chile 28 Israela 28 Russian Federationa 28
Chinaa 26 Italy 28 Singaporea 24
Colombia 28 Jordan 27 El Salvador 28
Costa Rica 28 Japan 28 Slovakiaa 26
Czech Republica 24 Koreaa 28 Sloveniaa 23
Denmark 28 Kuwaita 27 Sweden 28
Algeriaa 28 Sri Lanka 28 Thailand 28
Ecuador 28 Latviaa 26 Tunisia 27
Egypt 28 Moroccoa 26 Turkey 28
Spain 28 Mexico 28 Uruguay 28
Finland 28 Malaysia 28 Venezuela 28
France 27 Netherlands 26 South Africa 28
United Kingdom 28 Norway 28
Notes: The sample includes countries present in regressions using Debt enforcement without controlling for the
standard determinants of comparative advantages where the dependent variable is the value added to GDP over the
period 1981-2000. a: denotes countries missing in regressions where standard determinants of comparative advantages
are used.
Table A4. Sample in Growth Regressions
Country Number of Country Number of
industries industries
Australia 20 Japan 27
Austria 22 Korea 28
Canada 27 Kuwait 22
Chile 28 Sri Lanka 27
Colombia 25 Morocco 26
Costa Rica 23 Mexico 18
Spain 27 Malaysia 26
Finland 26 Netherlands 26
France 23 Norway 26
United Kingdom 26 Panama 18
Hong Kong 21 Poland 10
Hungary 26 Portugal 27
Indonesia 22 Singapore 21
Ireland 26 Sweden 28
Iran 28 Tunisia 17
Israel 17 Turkey 26
Italy 26 Uruguay 21
Jordan 22
Notes: The sample includes countries present in regressions using
Debt enforcement where the dependent variable is the real growth of value
added over the period 1980-2000.
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